In an Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme the ciphertext encrypting a message µ, is associated with a public attribute vector x and a secret key skP is associated with a predicate P . The decryption returns µ if and only if P (x) = 1. ABE provides efficient and simple mechanism for data sharing supporting fine-grained access control. Moreover, it is used as a critical component in constructions of succinct functional encryption, reusable garbled circuits, token-based obfuscation and more. In this work, we describe a new efficient ABE scheme for a family of branching programs with short secret keys and from a mild assumption. In particular, in our construction the size of the secret key for a branching program P is |P | + poly(λ), where λ is the security parameter. Our construction is secure assuming the standard Learning With Errors (LWE) problem with approximation factors n ω(1) . Previous constructions relied on n O(log n) approximation factors of LWE (resulting in less efficient parameters instantiation) or had large secret keys of size |P |×poly(λ). We rely on techniques developed by Boneh et al. (EUROCRYPT'14) and Brakerski et al. (ITCS'14) in the context of ABE for circuits and fully-homomorphic encryption.
Introduction
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) was introduced by Sahai and Waters [SW05] in order to realize the vision of fine-grained access control to encrypted data. Using ABE, a user can encrypt a message µ with respect to a public attribute-vector x to obtain a ciphertext ct x . Anyone holding a secret key sk P , associated with an access policy P , can decrypt the message µ if P (x) = 1. Moreover, the security notion guarantees that no collusion of adversaries holding secret keys sk P1 , . . . , sk Pt can learn anything about the message µ if none of the individual keys allow to decrypt it. Until recently, candidate constructions of ABE were limited to restricted classes of access policies that test for equality (IBE), boolean formulas and inner-products: [Coc01,BF03,GPSW06,Wat09,LW10,LOS + 10,ABB10,CHKP12,AFV11,Boy13].
In recent breakthroughs Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee [GVW13] and Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Sahai and Waters [GGH + 13c] constructed ABE schemes for arbitrary boolean predicates. The GVW construction is based on the standard Learning With Errors (LWE) problem with sub-exponential approximation factors, whereas GGHSW relies on hardness of a (currently) stronger assumptions over existing multilinear map candidates [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15] . But in both these ABE schemes, the size of the secret keys had a multiplicative dependence on the size of the predicate: |P | · poly(λ, d) (where d is the depth of the circuit representation of the predicate). In a subsequent work, Boneh et al. [BGG + 14] showed how to construct ABE for arithmetic predicates with short secret keys: |P | + poly(λ, d), also assuming hardness of LWE with subexponential approximation factors. However, in [GVW13], the authors also showed an additional construction for a family of branching programs under a milder and quantitatively better assumption: hardness of LWE with polynomial approximation factors. Basing the security on LWE with polynomial approximation factors, as opposed to sub-exponential, results in two main advantages. First, the security of the resulting construction relies on the hardness of a much milder LWE assumption. But moreover, the resulting instantiation has better parameter -small modulo q -leading directly to practical efficiency improvements.
In this work, we focus on constructing an ABE scheme under milder security assumptions and better performance guarantees. We concentrate on ABE for a family of branching programs which is sufficient for most existing applications such as medical and multimedia data sharing [APG + 11,LYZ + 13,PPM + 14].
First, we summarize the two most efficient results from learning with errors problem translated to the setting of branching programs (via standard Barrington's theorem [Bar86] ). Let L be the length of a branching program P and let λ denote the security parameter. Then, -[GVW13]: There exists an ABE scheme for length L branching programs with large secret keys based on the security of LWE with polynomial approximation factors. In particular, in the instantiation |sk P | = |L| × poly(λ) and q = poly(L, λ). -[BGG + 14]: There exists an ABE scheme for length L branching programs with small secret keys based on the security of LWE with quasi-polynomial approximation factors. In particular, |sk P | = |L| + poly(λ, log L), q = poly(λ) log L .
To advance the state of the art for both theoretical and practical reasons, the natural question that arises is whether we can obtain the best of both worlds and:
Construct an ABE for branching programs with small secret keys based on the security of LWE with polynomial approximation factors?
Our Results
We present a new efficient construction of ABE for branching programs from a mild LWE assumption. Our result can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (informal). There exists a selectively-secure Attribute-Based Encryption for a family of length-L branching programs with small secret keys based on the security of LWE with polynomial approximation factors. More formally, the size of the secret key sk P is L + poly(λ, log L) and modulo q = poly(L, λ), where λ is the security parameter.
Furthermore, we can extend our construction to support arbitrary length branching programs by setting q to some small super-polynomial.
As an additional contribution, our techniques lead to a new efficient constructing of homomorphic signatures for branching programs. In particular, Gorbunov et al. [GVW15b] showed how to construct homomorphic signatures for circuits based on the simulation techniques of Boneh et al. [BGG + 14] in the context of ABE. Their resulting construction is secure based on the short integer solution (SIS) problem with sub-exponential approximation factors (or quasi-polynomial in the setting of branching programs). Analogously, our simulation algorithm presented in Section 3.4 can be used directly to construct homomorphic signatures for branching programs based on SIS with polynomial approximation factors.
Theorem 2 (informal). There exists a homomorphic signatures scheme for the family of length-L branching programs based on the security of SIS with polynomial approximation factors.
High Level Overview. The starting point of our ABE construction is the ABE scheme for circuits with short secret keys by Boneh et al. [BGG + 14] . At the heart of their construction is a fully key-homomorphic encoding scheme.
It encodes a ∈ {0, 1} with respect to a public key A $ ← Z n×m q in a "noisy" sample:
are fixed across all the encodings and e $ ← χ m (for some noise distribution χ) is chosen independently every time. The authors show that one can turn such a key-homomorphic encoding scheme, where homomorphism is satisfied over the encoded values and over the public keys simultaneously, into an attribute based encryption scheme for circuits.
Our first key observation is the asymmetric noise growth in their homomorphic multiplication over the encodings. Consider ψ 1 , ψ 2 to be the encodings of a 1 , a 2 under public keys A 1 , A 2 . To achieve multiplicative homomorphism, their first step is to achieve homomorphism over a 1 and a 2 by computing a 1 · ψ 2 = (a 1 · A 2 + (a 1 a 2 ) · G) T s + a 1 e 2 (1) Now, since homomorphism over the public key matrices must also be satisfied in the resulting encoding independently of a 1 , a 2 we must replace a 1 · A 2 in Equation 1 with operations over A 1 , A 2 only. To do this, we can use the first encoding ψ 1 = (A 1 + a 1 · G) T + e 1 and replace a 1 · G with a 1 · A 2 as follows. First, compute A 2 ∈ {0, 1} m×m such that G · A 2 = A 2 . (Finding such A 2 is possible since the "trapdoor" of G is known publicly). Then compute
Subtracting Equation 2 from Equation 1, we get −A 1 A 2 + (a 1 a 2 ) · G T s + e which is an encoding of a 1 a 2 under the public key A × := −A 1 A 2 . Thus,
where a × := a 1 a 2 . Here, e remains small enough because A 2 has small (binary) entries. We observe that the new noise e = a 1 e 2 − A 2 e 1 grows asymmetrically. That is, the poly(n) multiplicative increase always occurs with respect to the first noise e 1 . Naïvely evaluating k levels of multiplicative homomorphism results in a noise of magnitude poly(n) k . Can we manage the noise growth by some careful design of the order of homomorphic operations? To achieve this, comes our second idea: design evaluation algorithms for a "sequential" representation of a matrix branching program to carefully manage the noise growth following the Brakerski-Vaikuntanathan paradigm in the context of fully-homomorphic encryption [BV14].
First, to generate a ciphertext with respect to an attribute vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) we publish encodings of its individual bits:
We also publish encoding of an initial start state 0: 1
The message µ is encrypted under encoding u T s + e (where u is treated as the public key) and during decryption the user should obtain a value ≈ u T s from {ψ i } i∈[ ] , ψ v 0 iff P (x) = 1. Now, suppose the user wants to evaluate a branching program P on the attribute vector x. Informally, the evaluation of a branching program proceeds in steps updating a special state vector. The next state is determined by the current state and one of the input bits (pertaining to this step). Viewing the sequential representation of the branching program allows us to update the state using only a single multiplication and a few additions. Suppose v t represents the state of the program P at step t and the user holds its corresponding encoding ψ v t (under some public key). To obtain ψ v t+1 the user needs to use ψ i (for some i determined by the program). Leveraging on the asymmetry, the state can be updated by multiplying ψ i with the matrix A v t corresponding to the encoding ψ v t (and then following a few simple addition steps). Since ψ i always contains a "fresh" noise (which is never increased as we progress evaluating the program), the noise in ψ v t+1 increases from the noise in ψ v t only by a constant additive factor! As a result, after k steps in the evaluation procedure the noise will be bounded by k · poly(n). Eventually, if P (x) = 1, the user will learn ≈ u T s and be able to recover µ (we refer the reader to the main construction for details).
The main challenge in "riding on asymmetry" for attribute-based encryption is the requirement for satisfying parallel homomorphic properties: we must design separate homomorphic algorithms for operating over the public key matrices and over the encodings that allow for correct decryption. First, we define and design an algorithm for public key homomorphic operations that works specially for branching programs. Second, we design a homomorphic algorithm that works over the encodings that preserves the homomorphism over public key matrices and the bits 2 and carefully manages the noise growth as illustrated above. To prove the security, we need to argue that no collusion of users is able to learn anything about the message given many secret keys for programs that do not allow for decryption individually. We design a separate public-key simulation algorithm to accomplish this.
Applications
We summarize some of the known applications of attribute-based encryption. Parno, Raykova and Vaikuntanathan [PRV12] showed how to use ABE to design (publicly) verifiable two-message delegation delegation scheme with a pre-processing phase. Goldwasser, Kalai, Popa, Vaikuntanathan and Zeldovich [GKP + 13] showed how to use ABE as a critical building block to construct succinct one-query functional encryption, reusable garbled circuits, token-based obfuscation and homomorphic encryption for Turing machines. Our efficiency improvements for branching programs can be carried into all these applications. 
Other Related Work

Organization
In Section 2 we present the lattice preliminaries, definitions for ABE and branching programs. In Section 3 we present our main evaluation algorithms and build our ABE scheme in Section 4. We present a concrete instantiation of the parameters in Section 5. Finally, we outline the extensions in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Notation. Let PPT denote probabilistic polynomial-time. For any integer q ≥ 2, we let Z q denote the ring of integers modulo q and we represent Z q as integers in (−q/2, q/2]. We let Z n×m q denote the set of n × m matrices with entries in Z q . We use bold capital letters (e.g. A) to denote matrices, bold lowercase letters (e.g. x) to denote vectors. The notation A T denotes the transpose of the matrix A. If A 1 is an n × m matrix and A 2 is an n × m matrix, then [A 1 A 2 ] denotes the n × (m + m ) matrix formed by concatenating A 1 and A 2 . A similar notation applies to vectors. When doing matrix-vector multiplication we always view vectors as column vectors. Also, [n] denotes the set of numbers 1, . . . , n.
Lattice Preliminaries
Learning With Errors (LWE) Assumption The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [Reg09], who showed that solving it on the average is as hard as (quantumly) solving several standard lattice problems in the worst case.
Definition 1 (LWE). For an integer q = q(n) ≥ 2 and an error distribution χ = χ(n) over Z q , the learning with errors problem dLWE n,m,q,χ is to distinguish between the following pairs of distributions:
There are known quantum [Reg09] and classical [Pei09] reductions between dLWE n,m,q,χ and approximating short vector problems in lattices in the worst case, where χ is a B-bounded (truncated) discretized Gaussian for some appropriate B. The state-of-the-art algorithms for these lattice problems run in time nearly exponential in the dimension n [AKS01,MV10]; more generally, we can get a 2 k -approximation in time 2Õ (n/k) . Throughout this paper, the parameter m = poly(n), in which case we will shorten the notation slightly to LWE n,q,χ .
Trapdoors for Lattices and LWE
Gaussian distributions. Let D Z m ,σ be the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Z m with parameter σ, that is, we replace the output by 0 whenever the || · || ∞ norm exceeds
Lemma 1 (Lattice Trapdoors [Ajt99,GPV08,MP12]). There is an efficient randomized algorithm TrapSamp(1 n , 1 m , q) that, given any integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and sufficiently large m = Ω(n log q), outputs a parity check matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a 'trapdoor' matrix T A ∈ Z m×m such that the distribution of A is negl(n)-close to uniform.
Moreover, there is an efficient algorithm SampleD that with overwhelming probability over all random choices, does the following: For any u ∈ Z n q , and large enough s = Ω( √ n log q), the randomized algorithm SampleD(A, T A , u, s) outputs a vector r ∈ Z m with norm ||r|| ∞ ≤ ||r|| 2 ≤ s √ n (with probability 1). Furthermore, the following distributions of the tuple (A, T A , U, R) are within negl(n) statistical distance of each other for any polynomial k ∈ N:
Sampling algorithms We will use the following algorithms to sample short vectors from specific lattices. Looking ahead, the algorithm SampleLeft [ABB10,CHKP12] will be used to sample keys in the real system, while the algorithm SampleRight [ABB10] will be used to sample keys in the simulation. where T GS refers to the norm of Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation of T. We refer the readers to [ABB10] for more details.
Algorithm SampleRight(A, G, R, T G , u, α):
, a vector u ∈ Z n q , and a Gaussian parameter α. Output: Let F := (A AR + G). The algorithm outputs a vector e ∈ Z m+k in the coset Λ F+u .
Often the matrix R given to the algorithm as input will be a random matrix in
Primitive matrix We use the primitive matrix G ∈ Z n×m q defined in [MP12] . This matrix has a trapdoor T G such that T G ∞ = 2.
We also define an algorithm invG :
, there exists a way to get A such that A ∈ {0, 1} m×m .
Attribute-Based Encryption
An attribute-based encryption scheme ABE [GPSW06] for a class of circuits C with bit inputs and message space M consists of a tuple of p.p.t. algorithms (Params, Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec):
Params(1 λ ) → pp : The parameter generation algorithm takes the security parameter 1 λ and outputs a public parameter pp which is implicitly given to all the other algorithms of the scheme. Setup(1 ) → (mpk, msk) : The setup algorithm gets as input the length of the input index, and outputs the master public key mpk, and the master key msk. Enc(mpk, x, µ) → ct x : The encryption algorithm gets as input mpk, an index x ∈ {0, 1} and a message µ ∈ M. It outputs a ciphertext ct x . KeyGen(msk, C) → sk C : The key generation algorithm gets as input msk and a predicate specified by C ∈ C.
It outputs a secret key sk C . Dec(ct x , sk C ) → µ : The decryption algorithm gets as input ct x and sk C , and outputs either ⊥ or a message µ ∈ M.
Definition 2 (Correctness). We require that for all (x, C) such that C(x) = 1 and for all µ ∈ M, we have Pr[ct x ← Enc(mpk, x, µ); Dec(ct x , sk C ) = µ)] = 1 where the probability is taken over pp ← Params(1 λ ), (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 ) and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Definition 3 (Security).
For a stateful adversary A, we define the advantage function Adv abe
with the restriction that all queries y that A makes to Keygen(msk, ·) satisfies C(x * ) = 0 (that is, sk C does not decrypt ct x ). An attribute-based encryption scheme is selectively secure if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv abe A (λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Branching Programs
We define branching programs similar to [BV14]. A width-w branching program BP of length L with input space {0, 1} and s states (represented by [s]) is a sequence of L tuples of the form (var(t), σ t,0 , σ t,1 ) where σ t,0 and σ t,1 are injective functions from [s] to itself.
The branching program BP on input x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) computes its output as follows. At step t, we denote the state of the computation by η t ∈ [s]. The initial state is η 0 = 1. In general, η t can be computed recursively as
Finally, after L steps, the output of the computation BP(x) = 1 if η L = 1 and 0 otherwise. As done in [BV14], we represent states with bits rather than numbers to bound the noise growth. In particular, we represent the state
Note that we can also write the above expression as v t [i] = 1 if and only if either:
This latter form will be useful for us since it can be captured by the following formula.
is also valid representation of a branching program BP.
For clarity of presentation, we will deal with width-5 permutation branching programs, which is shown to be equivalent to the circuit class N C 1 [Bar86] . Hence, we have s = w = 5 and the functions σ 0 , σ 1 are permutations on [5].
Our Evaluation Algorithms
In this section we describe the key evaluation and encoding (ciphertext) evaluation algorithms that will be used in our ABE construction. The algorithms are carefully designed to manage the noise growth in the LWE encodings and to preserve parallel homomorphism over the public keys and the encoded values. In our construction, however, all encodings will be under the same LWE secret s, hence for simplicity we will simply refer to such an encoding as ψ A,a .
Basic Homomorphic Operations
Definition 5 (Noise Function). For every A ∈ Z n×m q , s ∈ Z n q and encoding ψ A,a ∈ Z m q of a bit a ∈ {0, 1} we define a noise function as Noise s (ψ A,a ) := ||ψ A,a − (A + a · G) T s mod q|| ∞ Looking ahead, in Lemma 8 we show that if the noise obtained after applying homomorphic evaluation is ≤ q/4, then our ABE scheme will decrypt the message correctly. Now we define the basic additive and multiplicative operations on the encodings of this form, as per [BGG + 14]. In their context, they refer to a matrix A as the "public key" and ψ A,a as a ciphertext.
Homomorphic addition This algorithm takes as input two encodings ψ A,a , ψ A ,a and outputs the sum of them. Let A + = A + A and a + = a + a .
Add en (ψ A,a , ψ A ,a ) : Output ψ A + ,a + := ψ A,a + ψ A ,a mod q Lemma 2 (Noise Growth in Add en ). For any two valid encodings ψ A,a , ψ A ,a ∈ Z m q , let A + = A + A and a + = a + a and ψ A + ,a + = Add en (ψ A,a , ψ A ,a ), then we have
Proof. Given two encodings we have,
Thus, from the definition of the noise function, it follows that
Homomorphic multiplication This algorithm takes in two encodings ψ A,a = (A + a · G) T s + e 1 and ψ A ,a = (A + a · G) T s + e 2 and outputs an encoding ψ A × ,a × where A × = −A A and a × = aa as follows:
Note that this process requires the knowledge of the attribute a in clear.
Lemma 3 (Noise Growth in Multiply en ). For any two valid encodings ψ A,a , ψ A ,a ∈ Z m q , let A × = −A A and a × = aa and ψ A × ,a × = Multiply en (ψ A,a , ψ A ,a ) then we have
Proof. Given two valid encodings, we have
Thus, from the definition of the noise function, we must bound the noise e × . Hence,
where the last inequality holds since A ∈ {0, 1} m×m .
Note: This type of homomorphism is different from a standard fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) mainly for the following two reasons.
-To perform multiplicative homomorphism, here we need one of the input values in clear but the FHE homomorphic operations are performed without the knowledge of the input values. -The other big difference is that, here we require the output public key matrices A + , A × to be independent of the input values a 1 , a 2 . More generally, when given an arbitrary circuit with AND and OR gates along with the matrices corresponding to its input wires, one should be able to determine the matrix corresponding to the output wire without the knowledge of the values of the input wires. But, this property is not present in any of the existing FHE schemes.
Our Public Key Evaluation Algorithm
We define a (public) key evaluation algorithm Eval pk . The algorithm takes as input a description of the branching program BP, a collection of public keys {A i } i∈[ ] (one for each attribute bit x i ), a collection of public keys V 0,i for initial state vector and an auxiliary matrix A c . The algorithm outputs an "evaluated" public key corresponding to the branching program:
The auxiliary matrix A c can be thought of as the public key we use to encode a constant 1. We also define A i := A c − A i , as a public key that will encode 1 − x i . The output V BP ∈ Z n×m q is the homomorphically defined public key V L,1 at position 1 of the state vector at the Lth step of the branching program evaluation.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Recall the description of the branching program BP represented by tuples var(t), {γ t,i,0 , γ t,i,1 } i∈[5] for t ∈ [L]. The initial state vector is always taken to be v 0 := [1, 0, 0, 0, 0].
Our algorithm calculates V BP inductively as follows. Assume at time t − 1 ∈ [L], the state public keys {V t−1,i } i∈[5] are already assigned. We assign state public keys {V t,i } i∈[5] at time t as follows.
1. Let γ 0 := γ t,i,0 and γ 1 :
It is important to note that the public key defined at each step of the state vector is independent of any input attribute vector. Now, let V L,1 be the public key assigned at position 1 at step L of the branching program. We simply output V BP := V L,1 .
Our Encoding Evaluation Algorithm
We also define an encoding evaluation algorithm Eval en which we will use in the decryption algorithm of our ABE scheme. The algorithm takes as input the description of a branching program BP, an attribute vector x, a set of encodings for the attribute (with corresponding public keys) {A i , ψ i := ψ Ai,xi } i∈[ ] , encodings of the initial state vector {V 0,i , ψ 0,i := ψ V0,i,v0[i] } i∈ [5] and an encoding of a constant "1" ψ c := ψ A c ,1 . (From now on, we will use the simplified notations ψ i , ψ 0,i , ψ c for the encodings). Eval en outputs an encoding of the result y := BP(x) with respect to a homomorphically derived public key V BP := V L,1 .
The evaluation algorithm proceeds inductively to update the encoding of the state vector for each step of the branching program. The key idea to obtain the desired noise growth is that we only multiply the fresh encodings of the attribute bits with the binary decomposition of the public keys. The result is then be added to update the encoding of the state vector. Hence, at each step of the computation the noise in the encodings of the state will only grow by some fixed additive factor. The algorithm proceeds as follows. We define ψ i := ψ A i ,(1−xi) = (A i + (1 − x i ) · G) T s + e i to denote the encoding of 1 − x i with respect to A i = A c − A i . Note that it can be computed using Add en (ψ A c ,1 , −ψ Ai,xi ). Assume at time t − 1 ∈ [L] we hold encodings of the state vector {ψ Vt−1,i,vt[i] } i∈ [5] . Now, we compute the encodings of the new state values: ψ t,i = Add en Multiply en (ψ var(t) , ψ t−1,γ0 ), Multiply en (ψ var(t) , ψ t−1,γ1 ) where γ 0 := γ t,i,0 and γ 1 := γ t,i,1 . As we show below (in Lemma 4), this new encoding has the form V t,i + v t [i] · G T s + e t,i (for a small enough noise term e t,i ). Finally, let ψ L,1 be the encoding obtained at the Lth step corresponding to state value at position "1" by this process. As we show in Lemma 5, noise term e BP has "low" infinity norm enabling correct decryption (Lemma 8). The algorithm outputs ψ BP := ψ L,1 .
Correctness and Analysis
Lemma 4. For any valid set of encodings ψ var(t) , ψ var(t) for the bits x var(t) , (1 − x var(t) ) and {ψ t−1,i } i∈[5] for the state vector v t−1 at step t − 1, the output of the function
Proof. Given valid encodings ψ var(t) , ψ var(t) and {ψ t−1,i } i∈[5] , we have:
where the first step follows from the correctness of Multiply en algorithm and last step from that of Add en with e t,i = e 1 + e 2 where e 1 = − V t−1,γ0 T e var(t) − (1 − x var(t) ) · e t−1,γ0 and e 2 = − V t−1,γ1 T e var(t) − x var(t) · e t−1,γ1 .
Proof. We will prove this lemma by induction. That is, we will prove that at any step t,
. For the base case, t = 0, we operate on fresh encodings for the initial state vector v 0 . Hence, we have that, Noise V0,i,v0[i] (ψ 0,i ) ≤ B, for all i ∈ [5]. Let {ψ t−1,i } i∈[5] be the encodings of the state vector v t−1 at step t − 1 such that
. We know that ψ t,i = Add en Multiply en (ψ var(t) , ψ t−1,γ0 ), Multiply en (ψ var(t) , ψ t−1,γ1 ) . Hence, from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we get:
by Lemma 2. With ψ BP being an encoding at step L, we have
Our Simulated Public Key Evaluation Algorithm
During simulation, we will use a different procedure for assigning public keys to each wire of the input and the state vector. In particular, A i = A · R i − x i · G for some shared public key A and some low norm matrix R i . Similarly, the state public keys
The algorithm thus takes as input the description of the branching program BP, the attribute vector x, two collection of low norm matrices {R i }, {R 0,i } corresponding to the input public keys and initial state vector, a low norm matrix R c for the public key of constant 1 and a shared matrix A. It outputs a homomorphically derived low norm matrix
The algorithm will ensure that the output R BP satisfies A · R BP − BP(x) · G = V BP , where V BP is the homomorphically derived public key. The algorithm proceeds inductively as follows. Assume at time t − 1 ∈ [L], the we hold a collection of low norm matrices R t−1,i and public
We show how to derive the low norm matrices R t,i for all i ∈ [5]:
1. Let γ 0 := γ t,i,0 and γ 1 := γ t,i,1 .
Compute
Finally, let R L,1 be the matrix obtained at the Lth step corresponding to state value "1" by the above algorithm. Output R BP := R L,1 . Below, we show that the norm of R BP remains small and that homomorphically computed public key V BP using Eval pk satisfies that
Lemma 6 (Correctness of Eval SIM ). For any set of valid inputs to Eval SIM , we have
for any i ∈ [5]. For the base case t = 0, since the inputs are valid, we have that
. Hence, we get:
Thus, at the Lth step, we have by induction that
Proof. This proof is very similar to that of Lemma 5. We will prove this lemma also by induction. That is, we will prove that at any step t,
. For the base case, t = 0, the input R 0,i s are such that, R t,0 ∞ = 1, for all i ∈ [5]. Let R t−1,i ∞ ≤ 3m · (t − 1) + 1 for i ∈ [5]. We know that
Hence, we have:
Our Attribute-Based Encryption
In this section we describe our attribute-based encryption scheme for branching programs. We present the scheme for a bounded length branching programs, but note that we can trivially support unbounded length by setting modulo q to a small superpolynomial. For a family of branching programs of length bounded by L and input space {0, 1} , we define the ABE algorithms (Params, Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) as follows.
-Params(1 λ , 1 L ): For a security parameter λ and length bound L, let the LWE dimension be n = n(λ) and let the LWE modulus be q = q(n, L). Let χ be an error distribution over Z and let B = B(n) be an error bound. We additionally choose two Gaussian parameters: a "small" Gaussian parameter s = s(n) and a "large" Gaussian parameter α = α(n). Both these parameters are polynomially bounded (in λ, L). The public parameters pp = (λ, L, n, q, m, χ, B, s, α) are implicitly given as input to all the algorithms below. -Setup(1 ): The setup algorithm takes as input the length of the attribute vector .
1. Sample a matrix with a trapdoor: (A, T A ) ← TrapSamp(1 n , 1 m , q) .
2. Let G ∈ Z n×m q be the primitive matrix with the public trapdoor basis T G . 3. Choose + 6 matrices {A i } i∈[ ] , {V 0,1 } i∈ [5] , A c at random from Z n×m q . First, matrices form the LWE "public keys" for the bits of attribute vector, next 5 form the "public keys" for the initial configuration of the state vector, and the last matrix as a "public key" for a constant 1. 4. Choose a vector u ∈ Z n q at random. 5. Output the master public key The key-generation algorithm takes as input the master secret key msk and a description of a branching program:
The secret key sk BP is computed as follows. 1. Homomorphically compute a "public key" matrix associated with the branching program:
3. Output the secret key for the branching program as 
2. Finally, compute φ = r T out · [ψ||ψ BP ]. As we show in Lemma 8, φ = u T s + q/2 µ + e φ (mod q), for a short e φ . 3. Output µ = 0 if |τ − φ| < q/4 and µ = 1 otherwise.
Correctness
Lemma 8. Let BP be a family of width-5 permutation branching programs with their length bounded by L and let ABE = (Params, Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be our attribute-based encryption scheme. For a LWE dimension n = n(λ), the parameters for ABE are instantiated as follows (according to Section 5):
then the scheme ABE is correct, according to the definition in Section 2.2.
Proof. We have to show that the decryption algorithm outputs the correct message µ, given a valid set of a secret key and a ciphertext. From Lemma 4, we have that ψ BP = (V BP + G) T s + e BP since BP(x) = 1. Also, from Lemma 5, we know that e BP ∞ = O(m · L · (m · B)) = O(m 2 · L · B) since our input encodings have noise terms bounded by m · B. Thus, the noise term in φ is bounded by:
where m = O(n log q) and r out ∞ ≤ α √ m =Õ(n log q) 2 · L √ m according to Section 5. Hence, we have
Clearly, the last inequality is satisfied when q =Õ(n 7 · L 2 ). Hence, the decryption proceeds correctly outputting the correct µ.
Security Proof
Theorem 5. For any and any length bound L, ABE scheme defined above satisfies selective security game 3 for any family of branching programs BP of length L with -bit inputs, assuming hardness of dLWE n,q,χ for sufficiently large n = poly(λ), q =Õ(n 7 · L 2 ) and poly(n) bounded error distribution χ. Moreover, the size of the secret keys grows polynomially with L (and independent of the width of BP).
Proof. We define a series of hybrid games, where the first and the last games correspond to the real experiments encrypting messages µ 0 , µ 1 respectively. We show that these games are indistinguishable except with negligible probability. Recall that in a selective security game, the challenge attribute vector x * is declared before the Setup algorithm and all the secret key queries that adversary makes must satisfy BP(x * ) = 0. First, we define auxiliary simulated ABE * algorithms.
-Setup * (1 λ , 1 , 1 L , x * ): The simulated setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ, the challenge attribute vector x * , its length and the maximum length of the branching program L. 
-KeyGen * (msk, BP): The simulated key-generation algorithm takes as input the master secret key msk and the description of the branching program BP. It computes the secret key sk BP as follows.
1. Obtain a short homomorphically derived matrix associated with the output public key of the branching program:
q . Compute r out ← SampleRight(A, G, R BP , T G , u, α) such that F · r out = u (this step relies on the fact that BP(x * ) = 0). 3. Output the secret key for the branching program sk BP := (BP, r out ) Game Sequence. We now define a series of games and then prove that all games Game i and Game i+1 are either statistically or computationally indistinguishable. -Game 4: The challenger runs the real ABE algorithms and encrypts message µ 1 for the challenge index x * .
Lemma 9. The view of an adversary in Game 0 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 1. Similarly, the view of an adversary in Game 4 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 3.
Proof. We prove for the case of Game 0 and Game 1, as the other case is identical. First, note the differences between the games:
-In Game 0, matrix A is sampled using TrapSamp algorithm and matrices A i , A c , V 0,j ∈ Z n×m q are randomly chosen for i ∈ [ ], j ∈ [5]. In Game 1, matrix A ∈ Z n×m p is chosen uniformly at random and matrices
-In Game 0, each ciphertext component is computed as:
0,j e On the other hand, in Game 1 each ciphertext component is computed as:
) and ψ 0,j = R T 0,j (As + e). -Finally, in Game 0 the vector r out is sampled using SampleLeft, whereas in Game 1 it is sampled using SampleRight algorithm.
Thus, we can conclude that the public parameters in Game 0 are statistically indistinguishable from those in Game 1, and that the output of Enc is statistically indistinguishable from that of Enc * . When the "large" Gaussian parameter α is chosen appropriately (as discussed in 5), the output of the KeyGen and KeyGen * algorithms are also statistically indistinguishable. Thus, the view of an adversary in Game 0 is statistically indistinguishable from the view in Game 1.
Lemma 10. If the decisional LWE assumption holds, then the view of an adversary in Game 1 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 2. Similarly, if the decisional LWE assumption holds, then the view of an adversary in Game 3 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 2.
Proof. Assume there exist an adversary Adv that distinguishes between Game 1 and Game 2. We show how to break LWE problem given a challenge {(a i , y i )} i∈[m+1] where each y i is either a random sample in Z q or a T i · s + e i (for a fixed, random s ∈ Z n q and a noise term sampled from the error distribution e i ← χ). Let A = [a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m ] ∈ Z n×m q and u = a m+1 . Let ψ * 0 = [y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m ] and τ = y m+1 + µ q/2 . Now, run the simulated Setup * algorithm where A, u are as defined above. Run the simulated KeyGen * algorithm. Finally, to simulate the challenge ciphertext set ψ * 0 , τ as defined above and compute
Similarly, ψ c = (R c ) T (A T s + e) and ψ 0,j = R T 0,j (A T s + e), for j ∈ [5]. Note that if y i 's are LWE samples, then this corresponds exactly to the Game 1. Otherwise, the ciphertext corresponds to an independent random sample as in Game 2 by the left-over hash lemma. Thus, an adversary which distinguishes between Game 1 and Game 2 can also be used to break the decisional LWE assumption with almost the same advantage. The computational indistinguishability of Game 3 and Game 2 follows from the same argument.
To conclude, note that Game 0 corresponds to an encryption of the challenge message µ 0 in the real experiment and Game 4 corresponds to an encryption of the challenge message µ 1 (also in the real experiment). Hence, by the standard hybrid argument, no adversary can distinguish between encryptions of µ 0 and µ 1 with non-negligible advantage establishing the selective security of our ABE scheme.
Parameter Selection
This section provides a concise description on the selection of parameters for our scheme, so that both correctness (see Lemma 8) and security (see Theorem 5) of our scheme are satisfied.
For a family of width-5 permutation branching programs BP of bounded length L, with the LWE dimension n, the parameters can be chosen as follows: (we start with an arbitrary q and we will instantiate it later) When our scheme is instantiated with these parameters, the correctness (see Lemma 8) of the scheme is satisfied when O((n log q) 6 · L 2 · B) < q/4. Clearly, this condition is satisfied when q =Õ(n 7 L 2 ).
Extensions
We note a few possible extensions on our basic construction that lead to further efficiency improvements. First, we can support arbitrary width branching programs by appropriately increasing the dimension of the state vector in the encryption. Second, we can switch to an arithmetic setting, similarly as it was done in [BGG + 14].
